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Much more investment will be needed in developing countries, to achieve the
Millennium Development Goals, speciﬁcally, the goal of reducing poverty. In this
respect, the private sector investment is critical, bringing more funds, expertise
and eﬃciency to the development of projects in several essential areas, like en-
ergy, transport, water and telecommunications. In addition, the involvement of
Multilateral Development Agencies (MDAs) plays an important “enabling” func-
tion acting like a mechanism of risk reduction and enhancing credit. To address
these unexplored topics, an empirical analysis is performed of the cross-country
determinants of the private sector and MDAs participation in infrastructure Pub-
lic Private Partnerships, using developing countries data, from the World Bank’s
Private Participation in Infrastructure database. The results suggest the following:
the participation of MDAs is higher for less populous and poorer countries. Yet,
neither the level of political risk of a country nor respect for human rights seems
to play an important role in explaining multilateral participation in projects. Con-
cerning the private participation, also proxies for the country economic risk are
more relevant. Private sector seems to prefer to invest in projects located in richer
and less populous countries. Also statistically relevant is the country legal origin
and if the project has a MDA participation.
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11 Introduction and background
Infrastructure investments are essential to achieve economic prosperity, promoting growth
and enhancing well-being. It is well known that the developing countries will need much
more investment, particularly private sector investment, to achieve the Millennium De-
velopment Goals (MDGs), speciﬁcally, the goal of reducing poverty.1 The private sec-
tor involvement will bring more funds, expertise and eﬃciency to the development of
projects in several essential areas, like energy, transport (roads, tunnels, bridges, rail-
ways, airports), water and sanitation and telecommunications.
In order to foster private participation, developing countries should pursue macro-
economic stability and improve their institutional framework, namely, strengthening
procedures for contract enforcement and dispute settlement and developing a coherent
set of policies for trade, tax and competition. Additionally, the role of MDAs is critical
in all this process, on one hand, enhancing credit and acting like a mechanism of risk
reduction and on the other hand, helping governments to perform the necessary reforms.
This has been emphasized in several works, for instance, World Bank (1994), OECD
(2006), Hainz and Kleimeier (2006), Matsukawa and Habeck (2007), Pessoa (2008) or
Sorge and Gadanecz (2004).
One way of increasing the private participation in infrastructure projects is through
PPPs. These partnerships are a worldwide phenomenon, spread in developed countries,
but also in developing ones. They appear as a key instrument to promote economic
growth and enhancing well-being, aspects of particular importance in developing coun-
tries. Nevertheless, the implementation of PPPs in these countries is a challenging
task, facing several limitations. For instance, according to Pessoa (2006), many de-
veloping countries face problems in adopting an adequate regulatory framework, have
underdeveloped capital markets and non-competitive industries and are dependent from
investments made by a few of international and large companies, resulting in a lack of
negotiation power. Therefore, political, legal, social, economic and ﬁnancial risks may
be even more important in developing countries than in developed ones and as a conse-
quence, this same conclusion seems to be evident about the participation of MDAs in
PPPs arrangements, for those countries.
From the combination of developing countries risks with the risks that are inherent
to infrastructure investments2 and in addition, the fact that the majority of the invest-
1The MDGs were established in 2000, when leaders of countries from the entire world committed to
devote every eﬀort in order to achieve eight development goals by 2015. They include reducing extreme
poverty and hunger, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, achieve universal primary
education, ﬁghting disease epidemics and developing a global partnership for development.
2The existence of natural monopolies that exclude competition, the assets nature (capital-intensive,
immobile and not easily redeployed for other uses), the fact that outputs are usually non-tradable and
2ments are carried out with Project Finance3, we may conclude, at ﬁrst glance, that such
ventures were not appealing for private investors. But the reality shows another picture.
The 1990’s, surprisingly, face a boom in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to infrastru-
cture projects in developing countries. Some explanations to this exponential growth
presented by Ramamurti and Doh (2004) are the end of natural monopolies making reg-
ulation less needed, the prospect of quick proﬁts for ﬁrst-movers and the use of Project
Finance to reduce the risks. Another aspect mentioned is the adoption of favorable
legal measures and the end of outright expropriations, creating a new climate for FDI in
developing countries. As an additional illustration of the importance of private sector
participation, Straub (2008) points out the case of seven Latin American countries (Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru), where private investment
represented 16,4% of total investment in infrastructure in the period 1980-85, and if we
consider the period of 1996-2001, the percentage increase to 62,9%.
According to the PPI Database4, the peak of the private infrastructure boom was
1997, thereafter a number of factors led to a reduction in the number and amount of
projects, namely, the ﬁnancial crisis of 1997-98, the slowdown in economic activity, the
bursting of the dot-com and telecommunications bubbles and also, the fact that priva-
tization was a one-time phenomenon. More recently and after a downward trend from
1998 to 2003, private investment in infrastructure projects increase from 2004 to 2008,
although in this last year the number of projects face a small decline. Investments were
more evenly spread across all developing regions, however it become more concentrated
in sectors like telecommunications and energy who lead the recovery, followed by trans-
port with investments stabilized over the last three years. The sector with a traditionally
minor expression is still the water and sewerage sector (see Graph 1 and 2 in the annex).
In respect of MDAs participation in the total count of infrastructure projects, the
rate of participation as oscillated between 26% in 1991 and 5% in 2008, with an average
annual value of 13% during the period of 1990-2008 (see Graph 3).
Although outside of the time span of the present study, it should be mentioned that
the environment for PPP projects has been severely impacted by the recent ﬁnancial
crisis. The World Bank in its “February 2010 Assessment of the impact of the crisis
on new private participation in infrastructure projects Update 5” (World Bank, 2010)
witnessed the decline in the number and value of projects reaching ﬁnancial closure and
the existence of pricing problems related to political sensitiveness of the services to be provided, all
these factors contribute to enhance the riskier nature of infrastructure investments (see for instance,
Grimsey and Lewis (2002), for more details).
3That implies that project own assets and cash ﬂows are the sole source to meet ﬁnancial obligations
and to provide returns to investors.
4The World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, available at
http://ppi.worldbank.org.
3reinforce the importance of strong economic and ﬁnancial fundamentals and the backing
of ﬁnancially solid sponsors, in order to make projects viable. In addition, the role of
MDAs is emphasized in times of ﬁnancial distress, multilateral and bilateral agencies
continue to provide critical funding to private infrastructure projects.
To address these issues, we pretend to perform an empirical analysis of the cross-
country determinants of private sector and MDAs participation in PPPs, using develo-
ping countries data from the World Bank PPI database. To the best of our knowledge,
no other empirical study address these particular topics, although the risk reduction
eﬀect of the participation of MDAs has been tested on the credit spreads of Project Fi-
nance loans (see for instance, Sorge and Gadanecz (2004) and Kleimeier and Megginson
(2000)) and the determinants of aid allocation by multilateral development banks and of
FDI to developing countries have been also studied (see for instance, Neumayer (2003);
Neumayer and Spess (2005) and Rose-Ackerman and Tobin (2005)).
Based on the previous work of Hammami et al. (2006), we will try to explore how
diﬀerent country risk factors aﬀect the private sector participation and MDAs partici-
pation in PPPs arrangements. Hammami et al. (2006) is to the best of our knowledge,
the only empirical study on PPPs using the PPI database.5 In their study, diﬀerent risk
factors are explored as potential determinants of the number and value of PPPs projects
in developing countries, using projects’ data from 1990 until 2003.
Using the Hammami et al. (2006) study as a starting point, we will try to overcome
some of the limitations of their work, namely:
• First, we will use only projects that share the main characteristics of PPPs and
not, the full database available. Projects that are management and lease contracts
and full privatizations are therefore excluded;6
• Second, we will use more recent data (1990 to 2007), in the expectation that the
use of more recent data will add positively to the research;
• Third, we will use some new explanatory variables - we will include indicators of
the degree of social and ﬁnancial development of a country.
Finally and not yet studied, as far as we know, the main contribution of our work
will be the explanation of which risk factors are more relevant in determining the private
sector participation in infrastructure PPPs, as well as, the MDAs participation in such
projects.
5Although the database is often referred in descriptive studies, providing statistical information. See
for instance, Blanc-Brude et al. (2007), Pessoa (2008) or de M¨ astle and Izaguirre (2008).
6This aspect was also emphasized by Pessoa (2008), mentioning that not all forms of private sector
involvement in public provision are PPPs.
4In context of ﬁnancial crises where international banks are retreating from emerging
markets to preserve capital, MDAs are being called to ﬁll the gap and a more active role
is now required, creating more eﬀective partnerships with the private sector. This is a
topic that is gaining relevance and as an example of this, the conference on “PPP in
infrastructure” which took place in December 2008, for the ﬁrst time, devote one-day to
the roles which can be played by multilateral capacity building agencies as well as pri-
vate sector associations. In this respect, Bhattacharyay (2009) highlight the advantages
of the involvement of MDAs in infrastructure projects. A synthesis is “they can help
improve the ﬂow of private savings and capital into infrastructure investments by (i) de-
veloping bankable projects; (ii) designing appropriate, innovative ﬁnancial instruments;
(iii) assisting countries to enhance their technical capacity and knowledge, (iv) enhancing
ﬁnancial market depth, eﬃciency, liquidity, and adherence to international and regional
standards or best practices; and (iv) promoting further ﬁnancial integration”.
The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows: Next we will present the hypotheses
to be tested and the proxies used as measures of diﬀerent risk attributes, we then discuss
the methodology with a focus on models of limited dependent variable. In section 4, we
present the data. Results are presented and discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6
concludes.
2 Conceptual framework and hypothesis development
As emphasized above, risks are enhanced for infrastructure PPPs developed in emerging
countries and the involvement of MDAs plays an important “enabling” function acting
like a mechanism of risk reduction. Essentially, the involvement of multilateral organiza-
tions (ﬁnancial institutions and export credit agencies) provide a third-party guarantee,
increasing the creditworthiness of the arrangement. Therefore, in addition to the pri-
mary lending function, MDAs also have a catalyzing function of private funds, which
assumes particular relevance in times of ﬁnancial distress. But what country factors are
more relevant in explaining the MDA participation in a project? And which risk is the
more inﬂuential for the involvement of private sector?
In the empirical analysis that follows, we will try to answer the question how the
political, legal, social, economic and ﬁnancial environment in host countries inﬂuence risk
perceptions and hence, the participation of the private sector and MDAs in infrastructure
PPPs.
5Political Risk
We would expect to ﬁnd a clear relationship between the participation of private sec-
tor and MDAs in PPPs arrangements and the political risk of a country. More precisely,
private sector will prefer to invest in politically stable countries and MDAs should par-
ticipated in PPPs more frequently for projects developed in countries characterised by
high political risk - the higher the political risk of a country, the higher the probability
of a PPP to be structured with MDAs participation and inversely, the lower the degree
of private sector involvement.
Hypothesis 1 - The probability of having a PPP with a MDA participation is positively
related to the level of political risk.
Hypothesis 2 - The degree of private participation in a PPP is negatively related to
the level of political risk.
As proxies for the level of political risk, that may aﬀect infrastructure investments
we will use measures of the democratic regime (related to the access to government
oﬃces: elections and their competitiveness) and of democratic governance, meaning the
process whereby government make and implement legally binding decisions, all drawn
from Beck et al. (2000). Political risk is higher for countries where governments do not
exhibit political checks and balances7 or that restrain electoral competition.
• Index of Political Competitiveness, a variable that characterize the competitiveness
of elections. It measures the number of parties competing in elections and range
from 1 (low) to 7 (high competitiveness). More political competitiveness will
lead to a reduction of the political risk of a country, with more transparent and
accountable governments, which are pre-requisites for PPPs to be successful.
• The quality of governance aﬀects a country’s ability to beneﬁt from international
capital ﬂows. A key element in the description of any political system is the number
of decision makers whose agreement is necessary before policies can be changed
and it is generally accepted that countries with multiple decision makers may oﬀer
greater protection to investors from arbitrary government actions - to measure that
we will use the variable checks that is a measure of government accountability. As
an additional measure of the relationship of the executive and legislative branches
we will collect information on a country’s political system - countries are classiﬁed
as direct presidential (0), strong president elected by assembly (1) or parliamentary
(2).
7Checks and Balances refers to the separation of powers - a system of distribution of power among
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government used to balance the powers and prevent
one branch to obtain power in excess.
6Legal Risk
A PPP is, in essence, a bundle of contracts - ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial contracts.
Typically these contracts are naturally incomplete and prone to opportunistic behaviour.
Therefore, private investors must ensure they have legal rights and that the local law
enforcement is eﬃcient. It is expected that countries with strong legal protection will
be able to raise more long-term private capital to develop infrastructure projects and
the participation of MDAs with its eﬀect of “umbrella” will be less important for these
countries, thus:
Hypothesis 3 - The probability of having a PPP with MDAs participation is positively
related to the level of legal risk.
Hypothesis 4 - The degree of private participation in a PPP is negatively related to
the level of legal risk.
As proxies for the level of legal development, we will use the following:8
• Creditor rights index - We measure the creditor rights in the country in which the
project is located based on LaPorta et al. (1998) index and expanded by Djankov
et al. (2007). The authors show that legal creditor rights is an important deter-
minant of private credit development. The creditor rights index varies between 0
(poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights).
• Contract enforcement days - The number of calendar days to resolve a payment
dispute through courts, also from Djankov et al. (2007). LaPorta et al. (1998)
emphasizes the importance of legal enforcement as well the quality of the laws on
the books (measured by the creditor rights index). Both measures of the quality
of the legal system matters and provide a complementary analysis (laws on the
books and its applicability).
• Legal origin - A dummy variable that identiﬁes a country’s legal origin. This
variable was ﬁrst proposed by LaPorta et al. (1998) with four possibilities - English,
French, German and Nordic - and expanded by Djankov et al. (2007), adding a
ﬁfth category - Socialist (transition).9 A link between the origin of a country’s
legal tradition and the operation of its ﬁnancial system was ﬁrst established by
8Also used in previous studies, Esty and Megginson (2003), Subramanian et al. (2008) or Gatti et al.
(2008).
9The English legal origin includes the common law of England, and the former colonies, U.S., Aus-
tralia and Canada. The French legal origin includes the civil law of France and also, countries Napoleon
conquered (including Portugal and Spain) and former colonies. The German legal origin includes the
laws of the Germanic countries in Central Europe, but also countries in East Asia. The Nordic legal
origin - laws of the four Scandinavian countries. And the Socialist legal origin - for the new countries
that emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union, plus Mongolia. The Socialist category do not apply
to countries that have gone back to their pre-communist legal systems, where they were assigned to
their pre-war legal systems.
7LaPorta et al. (1998). The authors have found that countries with common law
legal institutions provide better protection to creditors than do countries with civil
law institutions. More recently, reinforcing this idea, Beck et al. (2004) empirically
demonstrate that countries with civil law, provide creditors with weaker legal rights
and as a consequence, ﬁrms face higher obstacles in contracting for external ﬁnance
than ﬁrms in other countries.
Economic and Financial Risks
The macroeconomic environment can also aﬀect project risks and the participation
of private sector and MDAs in PPPs, thus:
Hypothesis 5 - The probability of having a PPP with MDAs participation is positively
related to the level of economic and ﬁnancial risks.
Hypothesis 6 - The degree of private participation in a PPP is lower for countries
with higher economic and ﬁnancial risks.
In general, economic and ﬁnancial risks assessments improve for countries with larger
economic size (GDP), lower inﬂation, low external debt and more developed ﬁnancial
markets. Each determinant of economic and ﬁnancial development derives from the theo-
retical literature, for instance, Cantor and Packer (1996), Eichengreen and Mody (2000)
or Altunbas and Gadanecz (2003), found that the following macroeconomic fundamen-
tals are important as explanatory variables of the capital ﬂows to emerging markets:
• Real GDP per capita and economic growth, used to measure the evolution of the
country’s wealth.
• Inﬂation rate and international reserves. As Cantor and Packer (1996) argue, a
high rate of inﬂation points to structural problems in the government’s ﬁnances
and is a focus of instability. Therefore a controlled inﬂation and the existence
of signiﬁcative international reserves are indicators of a country macroeconomic
stability.
• External debt and general government balance. It is expected that governments
with large deﬁcits and high debt burden will be more interested in PPPs to solve
infrastructure problems. But at the same time, these two variables are a focus of
economic instability increasing the risk level of a country. A higher debt burden
imply a higher risk of default and the weight of the burden increases as a country’s
external debt rises relative to its foreign currency earnings (exports of goods and
8services). In addition, governments with large and structural deﬁcits increase
foreign indebtedness, which may become unsustainable over time.
• Fuel exports as a measure of a country’s natural resources. As mentioned in
Rose-Ackerman and Tobin (2005), the existence of natural resources is expected
to attract much more investment regardless of other relevant factors, and this is
also true for infrastructure projects.
• Population - An additional factor that should be accounted for, is the dimension
of the market. Concerning PPPs, it is an important feature of the attractiveness
of a project to the private sector, speciﬁcally, if projects are to be ﬁnanced also
with user charges. Therefore, PPPs tend to be more common in larger markets.
Linking infrastructure development more eﬀectively with private ﬁnance markets
would help to leverage and mobilize more capital. By contrast, underdeveloped ﬁnan-
cial markets makes the private participation on infrastructure projects relatively more
diﬃcult, particularly, as reported by de M¨ astle and Izaguirre (2008), when domestic
investors are becoming more prominent as a major source of funds to infrastructure
projects. In addition and as mentioned by Delmon (2007), the provision of new risk mit-
igation instruments by MDAs and the deepening of local capital markets also contribute
to the sustainability of PPPs. There is no single measure of ﬁnancial development, but
we will use the following, mostly commonly used and drawn from Beck et al. (2009):10
• Liquid liabilities of the ﬁnancial system to GDP - is a traditional measure of
ﬁnancial depth and measure the size of the ﬁnancial intermediary sector relative
the size of the economy. This indicator show the degree to which the ﬁnancial
sector mobilizes domestic savings - larger depth should reﬂect greater ﬁnancial
development.
• Financial claims on the private sector by deposit money banks and other ﬁnancial
institutions divided by gross domestic product (GDP) - countries with higher
private credit to GDP, usually have higher rates of economic growth;
• And ﬁnally, we will use the ratio of deposit money bank assets to the sum of deposit
money and central bank assets. This is a measure of the relative importance of
commercial vs central banks. It has been shown that countries where commercial
banks have a higher role in ﬁnancial intermediation (rather than central banks)
also face a higher degree of ﬁnancial development.
10See, for instance, Esty (2003).
9Social Risks
As a ﬁnal dimension to be assessed in its importance for PPPs projects we will
include measures of human development that we roughly called “social factors”. It
is expected that proxies for human development should have an eﬀect, particularly in
explaining MDAs participation in infrastructure projects, although that eﬀect should
not be so clear concerning private participation.
Hypothesis 7 - The probability of having a PPP with MDAs participation is higher
for countries with higher respect for human rights and civil liberties.
Hypothesis 8 - The degree of private participation in a PPP is higher for countries
with higher respect for human rights and civil liberties.
Besides the traditional measure of per capita income, as a proxy of well-being and
economic development (also included in our study), we will use two proxies for human
rights and social development, drawn from the “Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human
Rights Dataset” and also a measure of civil liberties, from the survey “Freedom in the
world”:
• Empowerment Rights Index - This is an additive index constructed from the Free-
dom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Workers’ Rights, Political Participation
and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for
these ﬁve rights) to 10 (full government respect for these ﬁve rights).
• Physical Integrity Rights Index - This is an additive index constructed from the
Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment and Disappearance indica-
tors. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full
government respect for these four rights).
• Civil liberties is measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the high-
est degree of freedom and seven the lowest.
In addition, we would like to know whether sectoral diﬀerences and regional diﬀer-
ences have an eﬀect on PPPs projects, therefore we will use:
• Dummies for regions - East Asia and the Paciﬁc, Europe and Central Asia, Latin
America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa;
• Dummies for sectors - energy, telecommunications, transport and water/ sewerage
as the base sector.
10Finally, we include time dummies in all regressions to capture potential time-speciﬁc
eﬀects that may inﬂuence the participation of diﬀerent agents in infrastructure projects.
3 Methodology
Our goal is to understand the relative importance of each risk factor in determining the
degree of participation of the private sector and also, that may aﬀect the probability of
a MDA participation in infrastructure projects developed through PPPs.
When the problem consists of describing the probability of the participation of a
MDA in a PPP, where we have only two alternatives, a discrete choice model should
be used. The simplest alternative is to use the Linear Probability Model (LPM) with
OLS regression, but it has some drawbacks namely, the possibility of the predicted
probabilities exceed one or to be less than zero, the assumption that the partial eﬀect
of any explanatory variable is a constant and the LPM will, by deﬁnition, produce
heteroscedasticity in the residual variance. Nevertheless, the LPM may be used as a
starting point and as an exploratory tool.
More proper models are the probit and logit that belong to the class of binary
response models. The choice of one of these models will guarantee that the predicted
values will be in the 0-1 interval. Either the probit or the logit model belong to the class
of binary response models of the form:
P(y = 1|x) = G(β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + ... + βkxk) (1)
where G(.) is a function taking on values strictly between zero and one: 0 < G(z) < 1
for all real numbers z. In the probit model, G(.) is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function (cdf), and in the logit model, the logistic distribution function.
In order to estimate the parameters, a likelihood function is maximized. The coeﬃ-
cients βj give the signs of the partial eﬀects of each xj on the response probability, but
the interpretation of their magnitude is not as straightforward as in the LPM.
For the purpose of study the probability of having a PPP with MDAs participation,
depending on the proxies for diﬀerent risks, we will use the three methods mentioned
above, although the LPM only as an exploratory tool, given its limitations.
To study the degree of private participation in response to diﬀerent risks, meaning
that y is a fractional response variable, ranging from 0-100, we will use the generalized
linear models (GLM), ﬁrst proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), with robust stan-
11dard errors. More precisely, our choice will rest on fractional response models that can
accommodate continuous values between 0 and 1 and in addition, can handle proportions
of exactly 0 or 1.
In both regressions, because we will expect correlation among the observations within
each country, we will use clustered robust standard errors.
The explanatory variables capture several country attributes that are expected to
have a signiﬁcative eﬀect on infrastructure investment through PPPs. We will use all the
variables presented in the previous section, in both regressions and particularly, when
explaining the degree of private participation, a dummy variable for MDAs participation
will also be considered, as it is an important factor that may inﬂuence a higher or lower
participation of the private agents.
Table 1 includes more detailed information on the variables and the expected eﬀect
of the explanatory variables on y, and Table 2 gives the summary statistics (see the
Data Appendix).
4 Data
In this cross-sectional study, the dependent variables were constructed from the Private
Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project Database (World Bank), using projects
developed in low- and middle-income countries that reached ﬁnancial closure from 1990
- 2007. We collect data on 96 diﬀerent countries, also classiﬁed in six regions - East
Asia and the Paciﬁc, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the
Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the
database, infrastructure projects are classiﬁed into four sectors: energy (electricity and
natural gas), telecommunications, transport (railways, airports, toll roads and seaports),
and water / sewerage. In addition, projects are classiﬁed into four broad categories of
private participation: management and lease contracts, concessions, greenﬁeld projects
and divestitures. For the purpose of our work, we will use concessions, greenﬁeld projects
and partial divestitures - types of private participation that could be considered PPPs,
sharing the key characteristics of long term nature of the relationship, distribution of
risks between the public partner and the private partner, bundling of diﬀerent project
phases and private ﬁnance.
For the explanatory variables, the ﬁrst set of data pertains to the political systems,
where all the indicators are drawn from Beck et al. (2000). The second set of data
includes proxies for the quality and enforceability of the legal system and are computed
12for 129 countries by Djankov et al. (2007), expanding the former data set of LaPorta
et al. (1998), available only for 49 countries. Concerning macroeconomic data, all the
variables are available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Proxies
for a country’s level of ﬁnancial development are taken from Beck et al. (2009), available
in the World Bank’s Financial Development Database, and ﬁnally, proxies to measure
the degree of social development of a country and respect for human rights are from “The
Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset”11 and from the survey “Freedom
in the world”.12
5 Results and discussion
All the results are presented in the data appendix and were obtained using STATA
software.
As a ﬁrst step and because collinearity may cause problems turning the regression
coeﬃcients unreliable, we perform a collinearity diagnostics using the VIF (variance
inﬂation factor) measure. The results point to no collinearity problems, as all the VIF
values are small.13
For clarity purposes, we divide the discussion of the estimation results in two sections.
5.1 The probability of a MDA participation in PPPs
Table 3 presents the results of the regressions on the probability of structuring a PPP
with a MDA participation. Each column presents a diﬀerent speciﬁcation, logit, probit
and LPM (only as a benchmark).
The estimates from the three models are consistent, meaning that the signs of the
coeﬃcients are the same across models and almost all the same variables are statistically
signiﬁcant in each model. In addition, for almost all those variables, the sign of the
eﬀect is according to what was expected (see Table 1). It should be noted that logit and
probit speciﬁcations lead to very similar qualitative results. In addition, goodness-of-ﬁt
measures are very close - percent correctly predicted around 85% and pseudo R-Squared
around 10%.
The main results point to a strong support of the economic variables, meaning that
economic risk seems to be the most relevant factor. As expected, richer (measured
11Available on-line at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/index.asp
12Available on-line at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439.
13VIF is an indicator of how much of the inﬂation of the standard error could be caused by collinearity.
13by GDP per capita) and more populous countries tend to have projects with lower
participation of MDAs. These ﬁndings are according to Neumayer (2003) results - in
a study of aid ﬂows from regional multilateral development banks, the author reported
that are the countries with lower per capita incomes that received more aid ﬂows and
a bias towards less populous countries was evident. In addition, countries with higher
deﬁcits, seems to beneﬁt more with MDAs participation in PPPs projects, in order to
make projects viable. In the same line is the result showed for international reserves. The
lower the level of a country’s reserves, more diﬃcult will be the access to international
loans. Therefore, if a country is in a fragile payment position this will be translated to
increased diﬃculties in borrowing from external sources, making a MDAs participation
more needed.
The legal dimension is also an important determinant of MDAs participation. Ac-
cordingly to our results, countries with higher legal risk measured by the index of creditor
rights and the number of days to enforce a contract, have a higher probability of a MDA
participation in a PPP project. Concerning the legal origin, the signs of the coeﬃcients
reported are in line with what was expected, although statistically relevant, only appear
the Socialist legal origin.
Concerning political risk proxies, only statistically relevant is the number of checks
and balances, meaning that MDAs participate more in projects developed in countries
with less accountable regimes, providing necessary additional political guarantees in
order to attract private investors.
In the ﬁnancial dimension, more developed ﬁnancial countries, as measured by pri-
vate credit to GDP, have a lower probability of MDAs participation in PPPs projects,
as expected.
Surprisingly, human rights variables do not appear particularly relevant, with the
exception of the empowerment index. Concerning this indicator, MDAs participation
seems to be a response to the level of social risk, and not as expected initially, a way of
reward countries that prove to respect more human rights. As emphasized by Neumayer
(2003), development banks proclaim a commitment to poverty reduction and human
development as well, but their perception of what constitutes the developing countries
needs appear to be conﬁned to the level of national income.
Likelihood ratio (LR) tests were performed, using logit speciﬁcation, to assess the
overall signiﬁcance of each risk dimension, as well as, the sector, regions and time dum-
mies (results are presented in Table 5). There is evidence in favor of the economic
and legal risk dimensions assessed in our study, but the ﬁnancial dimension and more
importantly, human rights variables, as well as, political risk proxies seems do not mat-
14ter in explaining the probability of a MDA participation in a PPP project, although
individually, some of these variables have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect.
Concerning regional and sector dummies, LR tests show that regions are jointly not
signiﬁcant and the same is true for sectors. In respect to the time dummies, there is some
weak evidence of the time explaining the probability of MDAs participation (individual
coeﬃcients not reported).
Next we turn our attention to the computation of average marginal eﬀects.14 In
Table 7, the average marginal eﬀects are presented only to the statistically relevant
variables. The results show that, in general, the magnitude is very small and more
precisely:
• Increasing real GDP per capita in 100%, decreases the probability of MDAs par-
ticipation (on average) by 0.0484, approximately, all else held constant;
• If the number of days to enforce a contract increases by 100%, the probability of
a MDA participation increases by 0.0456, ceteris paribus;
• If a country is 100% more populous, the probability of a MDA to participate in a
PPP infrastructure project is 0.0336 less, approximately, all else held constant;
• Particularly signiﬁcant is the magnitude of the Private credit to GDP coeﬃcient,
meaning that more developed ﬁnancial countries reduces the probability of a MDA
participation in about 0.132, controlling for all the other relevant factors.
5.2 The degree of private sector participation in PPPs
Table 4 presents the results of the regressions on the percentage of private sector partici-
pation in infrastructure projects. Again, each column presents a diﬀerent speciﬁcation,
fractional logit, fractional probit and LPM.
Private sector participation in PPPs projects is higher for countries with higher
GDP per capita and with less population, pointing to the fact that a higher degree of
private sector participation occurs for projects developed in richer, but smaller markets.
Nevertheless, our results are in line with Neumayer (2003) and Neumayer and Spess
(2005), where the authors show that population and GDP per capita are important
determinants of foreign direct investment to developing countries.
14Contrary to what happens with linear regression models, with nonlinear models the coeﬃcients βj,
do not have a direct interpretation as the marginal eﬀect - with nonlinear models, the marginal eﬀects
are nonlinear functions of the parameter estimates and levels of the explanatory variables.
15The empirical evidence shows that countries with an English legal origin tend to
attract more private sector participation. The legal protection provided by the common
law of England is rewarded face to the omitted class, the French civil law system.
Following LaPorta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2007), among others, common law
systems tend to provide better protection to private investors. In addition, concerning
the legal environment, measures of creditor rights and of a reliable enforcement, do not
show a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect in private sector investment decision.
MDAs participation, as expected, is an economically and statistically important
determinant of the degree of private sector participation. If a project have a MDA
participation, this will have an eﬀect of “umbrella” for all the project, acting like a
mechanism of risk reduction, providing guarantees and as a sign of creditworthiness to
private lenders, increasing their willingness to enter the project. The results show that
if a project has a MDA participation, then the percentage of private sector participation
increases by 0.0458, all else held constant (see Table 8).
Concerning political risk, the number of checks and balances is also an important
determinant of the degree of private sector participation, which is higher for countries
with better governance quality.
Slightly unexpected is the sign and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on Liquid liabilities
to GDP. Our results point to higher private sector participation in projects developed in
countries that mobilize few domestic savings. An explanation could rest in the fact that
private sector participation in infrastructure projects is essentially external participation
and is the answer to overcome a lack of lending capacity in the home country.15 The
average marginal eﬀects to the relevant variables are presented in Table 8.
LR tests were performed using logit speciﬁcation. The results show that, particularly
relevant to explain the percentage of private sector participation, appear the economic
and ﬁnancial dimensions (see Table 6). Although not individually relevant, sector dum-
mies are jointly important and in respect to the regional analysis, the empirical results
only show the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy statistically relevant, compared to Middle
East and North Africa. In addition, a LR test indicates that regions dummies are
just marginally jointly signiﬁcant. A time eﬀect was also tested and jointly, the time
dummies are not relevant explaining the degree of private sector participation.
15Esty (2003) had already noted that international banks are more likely to ﬁnance projects in
countries with less developed ﬁnancial systems.
166 Summary and Conclusions
Poor countries face chronic infrastructure deﬁciencies, particularly on sanitation, wa-
ter or electricity. Infrastructure projects are prone to speciﬁc risks, given its nature
and usually imply commitment for longer maturities, what makes investors particularly
exposed to risk. Therefore, private lenders should evaluate the diﬀerent risk factors,
project speciﬁc but also, related to the country environment where the project will be
developed. This risk assessment will be reﬂected in the willingness to enter in a PPP
arrangement and in the degree of such commitment. MDAs have a fundamental role
to play, acting like an additional partner, where the challenge is to promote more eﬀec-
tive partnerships between MDAs and the private sector, as each looks to the other to
complete complex arrangements.
The empirical evidence on the determinants of MDAs and private sector participation
in infrastructure projects show that economic conditions constitutes the most important
risk dimension, particularly related to the market size (population) and to a country’s
income level.
As such, MDAs participate more in infrastructure projects developed in poorer (mea-
sured by GDP per capita and international reserves), less populous countries and with
legal and ﬁnancial systems underdeveloped. Perhaps more disappointing is the fact
that human rights variables, at an aggregate level, do not play an important role as
determinants of the probability of such participation.
Concerning private sector participation, our results support the arguments that the
degree of private sector participation is higher for richer and less populous countries with
a common law legal origin and with less developed ﬁnancial systems. Also, projects with
MDAs participation will have a higher degree of private sector involvement, highlighting
the MDAs “enabling” function, as the perceived level of risk is reduced to the private
agents.
Notwithstanding the popularity of PPPs and their exponential growth in recent
years, few research has been made on this topic. Building in the ﬁrst empirical study of
Hammami et al. (2006) about the determinants of PPPs in infrastructure, we hope that
this new empirical approach, exploring new branches, could add to the scarce literature
on the ﬁeld and contribute to further research.
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19A Data Appendix - Variables
Table 1 - Expected eﬀect of the explanatory variables on y
Dependent variable
Eﬀect Probability of a PPP Degree of
Explanatory variables on a country with a MDA private
risk level participation participation
Political Risk
Political System - - +
Index of Political Competitiveness - - +
Checks (number) - - +
Legal Risk
Creditor rights - - +
Contract enforcement days (ln) + + -
Legal origin dummy (base: French) - - +
Social Risk
Physical Integrity Index - + +
Empowerment Index - + +
Civil liberties + - -
Financial Risk
Deposit money bank assets - - +
Liquid liabilities to GDP - - +
Private credit to GDP - - +
Economic Risk
General government balance to GDP + + -
External debt to total exports + + -
Economic growth - - +
Fuel exports - - +
Real GDP per capita (ln) - - +
Inﬂation Rate + + -
Population (ln) - - +
International reserves - - +
MDA dummy - +
The independent variables are:
• Political System - presidential(0), assembly-elected presidential (1) or parliamentary (2);
• Index of Political Competitiveness, which varies from 1 (low) to 7 (high competitiveness);
• Checks - number of governmental checks and balances, witch varies from 1 to 18;
• Creditor rights - An aggregate index, which varies from the value 0 for weak creditor rights to
4, meaning strong creditor rights;
• Contract enforcement days (ln) - the number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts;
• Legal origin - English, French, German and Socialist. We will use 3 dummies, being the French
civil law the reference;
• Physical Integrity Rights Index, it ranges from 0 (no government respect) to 8 (full government
respect);
• Empowerment Rights Index, it ranges from 0 (no government respect) to 10 (full government
respect);
• Civil liberties, which varies from 1 (highest degree of freedom) to 7 (the lowest);
• Deposit money bank assets, divided by the sum of deposit money and central bank assets;
• Liquid liabilities to GDP;
• Private Credit to GDP;
• General government balance (percent of GDP);
• External debt (percent of total exports);
20• Economic growth - GDP growth (annual %);
• Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports);
• Real GDP per capita (ln) - constant 2000 US$;
• Inﬂation Rate (annual percent change, GDP deﬂator);
• Population, total (ln);
• Reserves (in months of imports).
And for the regression on the percentage of private participation: a MDA dummy - a binary variable
that takes the value 1 if the PPP project has a MDA participation and takes the value 0, otherwise.
Table 2 - Summary statistics
Variable Number of Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
observations
Percentage of private participation 3727 0.803 0.297 0 1
MDAs participation 3727 0.113 0.317 0 1
Political system 3724 0.636 0.776 0 2
Index of Political Competitiveness 3726 5.861 1.689 1 7
Checks (number) 3695 3.620 3.556 1 18
Creditor rights 3721 1.624 0.905 0 4
Contract enforcement days (ln) 3727 5.914 0.380 3.30 7.29
English legal origin dummy 3727 0.205 0.404 0 1
French legal origin dummy 3727 0.444 0.497 0 1
German legal origin dummy 3727 0.246 0.430 0 1
Socialist legal origin dummy 3727 0.106 0.308 0 1
Physical Integrity Index 3698 2.876 2.090 0 8
Empowerment Index 3427 5.158 3.382 0 10
Civil liberties 3727 4.175 1.448 1 7
Deposit money bank assets 3563 0.868 0.140 0.12 1
Liquid liabilities to GDP 2656 0.408 0.237 0.06 1.30
Private credit to GDP 2653 0.348 0.290 0.02 1.66
General government balance to GDP 3489 -0.457 6.346 -35.02 33.20
External debt to total exports 3465 20.600 19.989 0.02 117.81
Economic growth 3723 5.130 5.473 -32.12 34.50
Fuel exports 3327 10.358 16.688 0 99.657
Real GDP per capita (ln) 3725 7.357 0.903 4.44 9.14
Inﬂation Rate 3723 82.902 405.424 -23.48 15442.30
Population (ln) 3727 18.578 1.840 14.30 21.00
International reserves 3480 6.558 3.887 0.06 23.69
Energy sector dummy 3727 0.405 0.491 0 1
Telecom sector dummy 3727 0.185 0.389 0 1
Transport sector dummy 3727 0.274 0.446 0 1
Water sector dummy 3727 0.135 0.342 0 1
East Asia and Paciﬁc dummy 3727 0.330 0.470 0 1
Europe and Central Asia dummy 3727 0.153 0.360 0 1
Latin America and Caribbean dummy 3727 0.320 0.466 0 1
Middle East and North Africa dummy 3727 0.022 0.148 0 1
South Asia dummy 3727 0.107 0.309 0 1
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 3727 0.068 0.252 0 1
21B Data Appendix - Results
Table 3 - Determinants of MDAs participation in PPPs infrastructure projects
Dependent variable: LOGIT PROBIT LPM
MDAs participation (MLE) (MLE) (OLS)
Political system 0.091 0.057 0.026
(0.68) (0.75) (1.25)
Index of Political Competitiveness 0.04 0.022 0.003
(0.31) (0.32) (0.2)
Checks -0.065** -0.034** -0.004
(-2.4) (-2.37) (-1.22)
Creditor rights -0.183* -0.106** -0.032**
(-1.84) (-1.97) (-2.14)
Contract enforcement days (ln) 0.393*** 0.242*** 0.082***
(2.58) (2.78) (3.25)
English legal origin dummy -0.195 -0.118 -0.028
(-0.6) (-0.65) (-0.54)
German legal origin dummy -0.596 -0.359 -0.117*
(-1.34) (-1.44) (-1.8)
Socialist legal origin dummy -0.928** -0.452* -0.082
(-2.09) (-1.89) (-1.3)
Physical Integrity Index 0.007 0.002 0.002
(0.15) (0.1) (0.25)
Empowerment Index -0.088* -0.048* -0.011
(-1.74) (-1.76) (-1.66)
Civil liberties -0.192 -0.102 -0.025*
(-1.49) (-1.38) (-1.71)
Deposit money bank assets 0.336 0.206 0.047
(0.55) (0.59) (0.48)
Liquid liabilities to GDP 0.882 0.451 0.106
(0.87) (0.83) (0.92)
Private credit to GDP -1.136* -0.564* -0.109
(-1.78) (-1.8) (-1.58)
General government balance to GDP 0.036* 0.022** 0.005*
(1.68) (1.97) (1.82)
External debt to total exports 0.002 0.001 0
(0.31) (0.27) (0.27)
Economic growth 0.009 0.007 0
(0.33) (0.46) (0.05)
Fuel exports -0.006* -0.004* -0.001
(-1.65) (-1.75) (-1.58)
Real GDP per capita (ln) -0.417*** -0.230*** -0.058***
(-3.49) (-3.35) (-3.28)
Inﬂation Rate 0 0 -0.000*
(-1.04) (-1.21) (-1.9)
Population (ln) -0.289** -0.164** -0.047***
(-2.53) (-2.49) (-2.93)
International reserves -0.102** -0.051** -0.012**
(-2.23) (-2.03) (-2.13)
Energy sector dummy 0.047 0.033 0.006
(0.11) (0.14) (0.12)
Telecom sector dummy -0.295 -0.151 -0.035
(-0.67) (-0.6) (-0.68)
Transport sector dummy -0.012 -0.02 -0.002
(-0.03) (-0.09) (-0.04)
East Asia and Paciﬁc dummy -0.738 -0.404 -0.115*
(-1.48) (-1.54) (-1.88)
Europe and Central Asia dummy 0.157 0.117 0
(0.25) (0.36) (0)
Latin America and Caribbean dummy 0.24 0.137 0.004
(0.37) (0.41) (0.06)
South Asia dummy -0.008 -0.014 -0.021
(-0.01) (-0.03) (-0.19)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.283 0.223 0.057
(0.4) (0.57) (0.55)
Time dummies jointly jointly jointly
signiﬁcant** signiﬁcant** signiﬁcant**
Constant 5.215* 2.674* 1.126***
(1.89) (1.77) (3.14)
Number of observations 2095 2095 2095
Log-Likelihood Value -799.556 -800.324
Percent correctly predicted 85.11% 85.30%
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.1002 0.0993 0.0878
legend: * statistically signiﬁcant at 90% level, ** at 95% level *** at 99% level
Clustered robust t statistics in parentheses
22Table 4 - Determinants of the degree of private sector participation
in PPPs infrastructure projects
Dependent variable: Percentage of LOGIT PROBIT LPM
private participation (GLM) (GLM) (OLS)
Political system -0.128 -0.075 -0.015
(-0.57) (-0.68) (-0.72)
Index of Political Competitiveness 0.041 0.037 0.012
(0.43) (0.66) (0.83)
Checks 0.050** 0.027*** 0.005**
(2.42) (2.6) (2.39)
Creditor rights -0.058 -0.035 -0.007
(-0.66) (-0.73) (-0.59)
Contract enforcement days (ln) 0.149 0.067 0.003
(0.71) (0.61) (0.11)
English legal origin dummy 0.933** 0.448** 0.094**
(2.25) (2.17) (2.03)
German legal origin dummy -0.548 -0.316 -0.068
(-0.94) (-1.00) (-0.93)
Socialist legal origin dummy -0.54 -0.336 -0.095
(-0.85) (-1.00) (-1.35)
Physical Integrity Index -0.081 -0.039 -0.009*
(-1.64) (-1.50) (-1.80)
Empowerment Index -0.021 -0.013 -0.001
(-0.55) (-0.64) (-0.24)
Civil liberties -0.026 -0.016 -0.002
(-0.21) (-0.25) (-0.13)
Deposit money bank assets -0.716 -0.378 -0.06
(-1.16) (-1.21) (-0.90)
Liquid liabilities to GDP -2.039*** -1.028*** -0.180**
(-2.88) (-2.81) (-2.25)
Private credit to GDP -0.088 -0.027 -0.009
(-0.13) (-0.08) (-0.15)
General government balance to GDP -0.004 -0.003 -0.001
(-0.23) (-0.29) (-0.39)
External debt to total exports 0.006 0.003 0.001
(1.30) (1.29) (1.18)
Economic growth 0.002 0.003 0.000
(0.12) (0.26) (0.18)
Fuel exports -0.012** -0.007** -0.001**
(-2.13) (-2.20) (-2.08)
Real GDP per capita (ln) 0.386* 0.191* 0.031
(1.79) (1.77) (1.62)
Inﬂation Rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.39) (-0.32) (-0.87)
Population (ln) -0.324*** -0.157** -0.029**
(-2.81) (-2.57) (-2.50)
International reserves 0.024 0.012 0.003
(0.59) (0.56) (0.61)
MDAs dummy 0.461** 0.235** 0.040**
(2.27) (2.24) (2.26)
Energy sector dummy -0.139 -0.085 -0.017
(-0.33) (-0.39) (-0.38)
Telecom sector dummy 0.463 0.259 0.045
(1.28) (1.38) (1.18)
Transport sector dummy 0.262 0.16 0.021
(0.82) (1.02) (0.65)
East Asia and Paciﬁc dummy 0.047 0.061 0.005
(0.13) (0.33) (0.13)
Europe and Central Asia dummy -1.041 -0.475 -0.086
(-1.45) (-1.31) (-1.27)
Latin America and Caribbean dummy -0.454 -0.186 -0.035
(-0.93) (-0.71) (-0.71)
South Asia dummy -0.056 0.019 -0.016
(-0.07) (0.05) (-0.23)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -1.357*** -0.672** -0.134**
(-2.64) (-2.49) (-2.35)
Time dummies jointly not jointly not jointly
signiﬁcant signiﬁcant signiﬁcant**
Constant 5.842** 2.960** 1.232***
(2.50) (2.46) (5.26)
Number of observations 2095 2095 2095
Log-Likelihood Value -621.457 -620.828
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.0946 0.0919 0.0944
legend: * statistically signiﬁcant at 90% level, ** at 95% level *** at 99% level
Clustered robust t statistics in parentheses
23Table 5 - Likelihood Ratio tests for MDAs participation in PPPs infrastructure projects
Dependent variable: LR tests Overall signiﬁcance
MDAs participation LOGIT at 95% level
(N=2095)
Risk dimensions:
Political LR chi2(3) = 3.68 Not signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.2984
Legal LR chi2(5) = 12.19 Signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.0323
Social LR chi2(3) = 5.34 Not signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.1484
Financial LR chi2(3) = 3.47 Not signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.3246
Economic LR chi2(8) = 42.93 Signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Dummies:
Sector LR chi2(3) = 3.16 Not signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.3679
Regions LR chi2(5) = 9.42 Not signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.0934
Time LR chi2(16) = 30.38 Signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.0161
Table 6 - Likelihood Ratio tests for the percentage of private sector participation
in PPPs infrastructure projects
Dependent variable: LR tests Overall signiﬁcance
Percentage of private LOGIT at 95% level
participation (N=2095)
Risk dimensions:
Political LR chi2(3) = 2.98 Not signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.3945
Legal LR chi2(5) = 5.74 Not signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.3327
Social LR chi2(3) = 2.26 Not signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.5210
Financial LR chi2(3) = 10.03 Signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.0183
Economic LR chi2(8) = 16.31 Signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.0382
Dummies:
Sector LR chi2(3) = 10.09 Signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.0178
Regions LR chi2(5) = 11.48 Signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.0427
Time LR chi2(16) = 15.31 Not signiﬁcant
Prob > chi2 = 0.5019
24Table 7 - Average Marginal Eﬀects for the probability of MDAs participation
in PPPs infrastructure projects




Contract enforcement days (ln) 0.0456
Empowerment Index -0.0102
Private credit to GDP -0.1320
General government balance to GDP 0.0042
Fuel exports -0.0007
Real GDP per capita (ln) -0.0484
Population (ln) -0.0336
International reserves -0.0118
*Average marginal eﬀects on Prob(mdas=1) obtained after logit
Table 8 - Average Marginal Eﬀects for the percentage of private participation
in PPPs infrastructure projects
Dependent variable: Average Marginal Eﬀect
percentage of private (Fractional LOGIT)*
participation
Checks (number) 0.0049
English legal origin dummy 0.0925
Liquid liabilities to GDP -0.2022
Fuel exports -0.0012
Real GDP per capita (ln) 0.0382
Population (ln) -0.0321
MDAs dummy 0.0458
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.1346
*Average marginal eﬀects obtained after fractional logit
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